R & D subsidies and export performance of manufacturing industries by Klodt, Henning
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Klodt, Henning
Working Paper
R & D subsidies and export
performance of manufacturing
industries
Kiel Working Papers, No. 287
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Klodt, Henning (1987) : R & D subsidies and export performance of
manufacturing industries, Kiel Working Papers, No. 287, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/1100Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 287





Institut fur Wfeltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel




Kiel Working Paper No. 287





The author himself, not the Kiel Institute of World Eco-
nomics, is solely responsible for the contents and distribu-
tion of each Kiel Working Paper.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form,
interested readers are requested to direct criticisms and
suggestions directly to the author and to clear any quota-
tions with him.Introduction
In a sense, the current high-tech policies look like an
anachronism: In almost all industrialized countries govern-
ments face the need to cut subsidies to private enterprises
in order to reduce their budget deficits. In contrast to
these efforts public fundings of company research and de-
velopment (R&D) are growing to unprecedented levels. The
most striking example is obviously given by the United
States, where the SDI-programme conflicts with the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings act. But also in Western Europe a variety of
new technology programmes was launched in past years. At the
national level the 4-megabit chip programme of West Germany
(Siemens) and the Netherlands (Philips/Valvo) could be
mentioned. This project started in 1986 and involves public
subsidies of about 250 million dollars. It centrally aims at
reinventing a technology that is already available from
Japanese and U.S. firms. The outstanding exception from this
subsidy race is Japan, where direct government support to
R&D has always been of minor importance. Instead, indirect
measures like tax credits and low interest loans are pre-
ferred for stimulating innovative activities of enterprises.
At the international level the discussion focusses primarily
on the EUREKA initiative, which started in 1985 and which
now involves more than one hundred different research pro-
jects. The biggest EUREKA project is the Eurolaser with
estimated public funds of about 200 million dollars. On
average, public subsidies within the EUREKA initiative
amount to 50 million dollars per project. In addition, the
European Community runs some technology programmes of its
own, e.g. ESPRIT (1984-88; 750 million ECU), BRITE (1985-88;
150 million ECU), the biotechnology-programme (1985-89; 55
million ECU), and RACE (1986-96). Most of these programmes
are predominantly devoted to applied commercial R&D. Up to
now, the EC funds are rather small as compared to national- 2 -
funds. In 1986 total EC expenditures on science and tech-
nology amounted to less than 1 billion ECU, whereas national
governments within the European Community spent about 30
billion ECU on this subject. According to a proposal of the
European Commission EC funds will be raised to 7.7 billion
ECU for the period from 1987 to 1991.
The general purpose of all of these R&D programmes is giving
European enterprises a competitive edge in high technolo-
gies, especially on U.S. and Japanese firms. The decisive
point in this context is, therefore, whether R&D subsidies
appear to be adequate means of improving the competitiveness
of private firms. Before entering the details it seems
appropriate to give a brief survey of R&D expenditures and
technology policies in major industrialized countries.
Current Trends in Innovation Policies
Figure 1 presents the development of aggregate R&D intensi-
ties in five countries. These countries are spending about
90 per cent of total R&D expenditures within the whole OECD
area. With the exception of the United Kingdom the share of
R&D expenditures in gross domestic product is substantially
increasing since the early eighties. Due to heavy cuts in
the NASA-budget in the late sixties and early seventies and
as a result of a rapid catching^-up of Japan and West Germany
the international differences in R&D intensities diminished
over time. In relative terms the United States has lost its
dominant position, whereas in absolute terms the United
States still spends as much on R&D as Japan and Western
Europe together.
Despite the similarities in R&D intensities the five count-
ries vary considerably in the priority given" to different
objectives of R&D . Table 1 shows the shares of the five
1 Cf., e.g., OECD (1984).- 3 -
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most important government institutions in total public R&D
expenditures for each country. It reveals the predominance
of military R&D in the United States, in France and in the
United Kingdom. Japan and West Germany, on the,other hand,
concentrate their funds on civilian R&D. This table does not
show, however, the extent of coordination among the differ-
ent public institutions. In the United States, France, and
the United Kingdom, the level of coordination among differ-
ent institutions is quite low. By .and large, in these
countries each department is left to decide how much it
needs to spend on R&D. In West Germany, in contrast, the- 4 -
Table 1 - Share of the Five Largest Ministries, Departments
or Agencies in Direct Government R&D Funding
Percentage
JNITED STATES Department of Defence 53
National Aeronautics and Space Admini-
stration 15
Department of Energy 12
Department of Health and Welfare 10
National Science Foundation 3
JAPAN Prime Minister's Office 57
Ministry for International Trade and
Industry 17
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fischeries 9
Ministry of Education 8
Ministry of Health and Welfare 4
WEST GERMANY Federal Ministry of Research and
Technology
Federal Ministry of Defence
Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs
Federal Ministry of Education and
Science







FRANCE Ministry of Defence 38
Ministry of Industry 26
National Centre for Scientific
Research 15
National Centre for Telecommunication
Studies 4
Ministry of Agriculture 3
UNITED KINGDOM Ministry of Defence
Department of Education and Science
Department of Trade and Industry
Department of Energy







Source: OECD; own calculations.- 5 -
Federal Ministry of Research and Technology is specifically
responsible for coordinating every federal R&D expenditure.
The science policy of Japan, finally, is mainly character-
ized by the large measure of common accord achieved by
numerous councils and committees at various levels. In
addition, the share of subsidies and research contracts in
government funds to company R&D is quite low (Table 2) .
Table 2 - Direct and Indirect Government Support to Company










































Source: Goto, Wakasugi (1987); own calculations.
All in all, the different strategies of R&D policies in
2
these five countries could be summarized as follows : The
U.S. government commits its money to R&D primarily through
research contracts with private firms. There is no strict
separation, therefore, of government purchases from R&D
subsidies. Western Europe's governments, in contrast, are
more obliged to promoting specific technologies. In many
cases catching-up with U.S. and Japanese technologies is the
major incentive of spending public funds. In Japan, finally,
private enterprises are involved in government decisions to
a large extent and direct R&D subsidies are very limited.
In the United Stataes, in contrast, the R&D tax credit is
estimated to cost close to $ 1 billion a year, whereas
direct government support to company R&D amounts to more
than $ 20 billion (Brown, 1984).
For an international comparison of high-tech policies
Klodt (1987); Nelson (1984); Pavitt, Walker (1976).
see- 6 -
Export Performance of Research-Intensive Industries
Government inputs in technology programmes are fairly well
documented. The measurement of output of these programmes is
much more difficult and raises severe conceptual problems.
The appropriate assessment of the technological performance
of countries and firms is far from clear. The numbers of
patents granted, the levels of productivity and the shares
of new products in sales are some of the proposed indica-
tors . Another often used indicator is the export-import
ratio in high-technology products. Such products are identi-
fied by the R&D intensity of production processes in techno-
logically advanced countries. The first of such lists, the
so-called "Kelly list", was generated by the OECD in the
late sixties (OECD, 1970). For an assessment of the techno-
logical position of the five countries in consideration an
updated version of Kelly's list was applied in order to
calculate export-import ratios in technology-intensive goods
2
for the year 1984 .
The results are presented in Figure 2. Japan's exports of
high-tech products are more than four times as high as its
imports in this product category. The remaining four coun-
tries also show an export-import ratio above unity, but
their surplus is substantially lower than the Japanese one.
In addition, Figure 2 gives information on the share of
direct government funds in total company R&D expenditures.
Notably, the most successful netexporter of high-tech pro-
ducts has the lowest level of government subsidies. And West
Germany ranks fourth in government funding, whereas it ranks
second in export-import ratios. If any, the relationship
between direct government R&D support and export-import
ratios in high-technology products seems to be inverse
(other things equal).
Cf., e.g., Glismann,. Horn (1986).
2
This updated list is presented in Klodt (1987).- 7 -
Figure 2
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One reason of the relative ineffectiveness of public support
may be found in the fact that all governments are concen-
trating their subsidies on only a few industries. Within the
usual industrial classifications there are six industries
that could be called highly research-intensive: namely aero-
space, electrical equipment, machinery, chemicals, instru-
ments, and motor vehicles. On average, R&D expenditures of
these branches account for 80 to 90 per cent of aggregate
R&D expenditures, whereas their share in total output of
manufacturing is about 50 per cent. The distribution of- 8 -
public funds as compared to privately financed funds is
presented in Table 3. Obviously, two out of six research-
intensive industries are receiving the lion's share of
government funds. In the United Kingdom, e.g., the subsidies
to aerospace and electrical equipment account for more than
90 per cent of total R&D subsidies, whereas the share of
these industries in private funds is less than 40 per cent.
























































































Source: OECD, own calculations.- 9 -
As a consequence, the governmental preference for aerospace
and electrical equipment is discriminating all other
research-intensive industries. This discrimination even
applies to Japan, where the share of instrument and motor
vehicles in public funds is less than one per cent, whereas
their share in private funds amounts to 18 per cent. More-
over, the actual discrimination is partly hidden by the data
given in Table 3 due to a comparatively high level of aggre-
gation. In fact, there are only three technologies which are
heavily subsidized all over the world: Aerospace, microelec-
tronics and nuclear power plants.
In the following an attempt is made to reveal the impact of
R&D subsidies on the export performance of research inten-
sive industries. For this purpose three indexes of national
specialization in exports and R&D are calculated:
Ix . 1» (Xij1;j ij^
Ip - in (P^/Ip^l : ^/"Pij)
o „„) : <*»„/»«!;,>
where x denotes exports, p and g denote private and govern-
ment R&D funds, i and j denote industries and countries. The
data for the six industries and five countries in considera-
tion are presented in Tables Al and A2 in the appendix .
Hence, a pooled sample of 30 observations for each index is
available. An OLS regression approach on these data yields
the following equation :
I = -.241 + .961 I - .3551 R
2 = .47 F = 13.94
x P g
(-1.70) (4.53) (-2.17)
The appendix presents the original values instead of the
logarithmic indexes. For a list of concordance between the
classifications of OECD-data on trade and on R&D see Klodt
(1987) .- 10 -
According to these results the impact of government funds on
export performance is even negative, whereas the impact of
private funds is positive.
Apparently there is a high overlapping in the sectoral
structure of technology policies. Imitating the strategy of
the technological leader still seems to be the major guide-
line for governments to shape public R&D expenditures. This
2
strategy usually aims at "picking the winners" . According
to the empirical evidence, however it appears not to be a
very successful one. Since governments do not know the win-
ners of tomorrow, they usually pick the winners of yester-
day. As a result, public R&D subsidies give support to ex-
cess capacities in some industries and discriminate against
R&D activities in other industries . Perhaps the excess
capacities in producing microelectronic chips and the sharp
competition in passenger aeroplanes can at least partially
be attributed to competing high-tech policies in these areas
all over the world.
Lessons from Case Studies
By and large, this critical assessment of public R&D subsi-
dies is supported by case studies on big science projects.
In the following, a brief comment on some of the outstanding
examples in this respect are presented. As a first example,
the British energy policy is devoted to promoting advanced
gas-cooled reactors. The first of these power plants was
intended to be completed in 1970. Actually, it was commis-
sioned in 1983 (Table 4). Moreover, despite the large amount
of public funds the United Kingdom did not export any
t-values in brackets.
2 Cf. OECD (1982).
3 Cf. Nelson (1983); Eliasson (1984).- 11 -
nuclear power plant at all since the year 1957. And in West
Germany the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology has
spent more than DM 3 billion on a natrium-cooled fast
breeder, which initially should have been finished in 1979
and still is in the course of construction . In the United
States, finally, the Clinch River fast breeder project was
ceased in 1983 after a twenty-year development period.




























Source: Henderson (1977); Jahrbuch der Atomwirtschaft
(1984) .
In the case of microelectronics, the above mentioned 4-mega-
bit chip provides a good illustration of European policy
strategies. This programme of the Dutch and and the West
German governments subsidizes the research of Siemens and
Philips-Valvo. When the programme started, Toshiba had al-
ready been successful in producing such a chip. And on the
1987 CeBit-fair in Hanover IBM presented a 4-megabit chip of
its own. In March 1987, Siemens and Valvo finally arrived at
producing the European 4-megabit chip. It seems to be doubt-
ful that this project will ever become a commercial success.
Cf . , e.g., Keck (1981) .- 12 -
In addition, the Super-Computer Project of the British go-
vernment, a similar project of the French government and
West Germany's Siemens computer project could be mentioned.
None of them could menace the leading position of U.S. and
Japanese firms in the computer market.
Aerospace is the third field of big-science failures. Per-
haps the most prominent example is given by the supersonic
jet Concorde. Initially, production of more than one hundred
aircrafts of this type was intended to start in 1970. In
fact, the first aircraft was finished in 1975. In 1978, when
production was stopped, only fifteen Concordes were complet-
ed and all of them where exclusively sold to British and
French airlines. To the British taxpayer the Concorde pro-
ject meant a loss of about 2 billion pounds and the losses
of the French government presumably are in a similar order
of magnitude.
A final word on the Airbus: This project is the most cited
example of a successful European technology policy. Evident-
ly, the Airbus can be regarded as a technological success.
It largely benefitted by the trends towards energy-saving
engines and wide-bodied aeroplanes. The market shares of
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas were reduced and Lockheed was
completely driven out of the market for non-military passen-
ger jets (Economist, 1985). Despite these impressive re-
sults, however, Airbus Industries is still unable to pay
for the development and production costs of its own (Tab-
le 5). When the Airbus programme was started, government
subsidies were intended to provide temporary assistance for
an infant industry. Nowadays, the former infant has become a
grown-up, but it still depends on public support.
This enumeration could easily be extended: The Supersonic
Transport Program of the U.S. government brought about a- 13 -
Table 5 - Subsidies of the West German Government to the
Airbus-Programme up to 1990
Government support to ...
Development costs
A 300, 310, 320
A 330/340 (estimate)
Sales promotion
A 300, 310, 320
Production costs









loss of one billion dollars , the French Caravelle could not
be sold at cost, and the West German passenger jet VFW 614
was never finished. All in all, the lessons from subsidized
big science projects are unequivocal - unequivocally nega-
tive.
Hence, our proposition would be that government funds should
be less concentrated on big science projects. In addition,
the empirical evidence suggests that indirect means should
be preferred over direct support of company is R&D in order
to avoid distortions of the allocation of R&D funds to the
largest extent possible. Finally, it should be kept in mind
that attention tends to be diverted away from commercial
activities if a growing part of income comes directly from
public sources.
The follower of this programme, the Aerospace Plane, is
expected to be finished by the end of the next decade. Ac-
cording to an M.I.T. estimate the total costs of this pro-
ject will amount to $ 17 billion (Korthals-Altes, 1987).- 14 -
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Source: Table 3.- 15 -
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